Who Wants the Caliphate?
Who Wants the Caliphate?
Dreams, pasts, and futures
Recalling the caliphate means understanding that the challenges that confront Muslims collectively are neither religious nor cultural but political, and their resolution can only be found in a politics in the name of Islam. This politics has no necessary content other than that struggled over in the historical sequence inaugurated by the return of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) [from his ascension to the heaven] … Recalling the caliphate, then, is a decolonial declaration, it is a reminder that Islam is Islam, and for Muslims that is all it needs to be.16
it remains to be seen whether history will come to an end with the apotheosis of a universal civilization (prophecy #1), the universal triumph of ethnonationalism with its many separated and autonomous nation (based)-states (prophecy #2), or whether human beings, having lived in multinational empires many times before the modern era, are ready to do so again, even on politically liberal terms (prophecy #3).17
The flowing blood
An absolutist theocracy or a tolerant Islamic union?
Islam saved Jewry. This is an unpopular, discomforting claim in the modern world. But it is a historical truth. The argument for it is double. First, in 570 CE, when the Prophet Mohammad was born, the Jews and Judaism were on the way to oblivion. And second, the coming of Islam saved them, providing a new context in which they not only survived, but flourished, laying foundations for subsequent Jewish cultural prosperity – also in Christendom – through the medieval period into the modern world. . . . Had Islam not come along, Jewry in the west would have declined to disappearance and Jewry in the east would have become just another oriental cult.26
The past: History and normative tradition
The five historical models of the caliphate
The theory of the caliphate
All Ahl al-Sunnah, all Murjiʾa, all Shiʿa, and all Kharijites have agreed unanimously on the obligation of the Imamate and that the Ummah has an obligation to obey a just Imam who establishes the rulings of God over them, managing their affairs with the Law brought by the Messenger of God. The only exception are the Najadāt of the Kharijites, who said that people have no obligation to have an imam; it is upon them, rather, to fulfill each other’s rights.40
There is consensus that installing an imam is an obligation. The disagreement is on whether the obligation is upon God or upon creation, by revelational evidence or rational. And [our] school holds that it is an obligation upon the creation through revelation, as the Prophet ﷺ said, “Whoever dies without knowing the imam of his time dies in pre-Islamic ignorance,”42 which is why the Ummah made the installing of an imam their utmost concern, even before his burial (i.e., of the Prophet), and so it should be after the death of every imam, as many obligations of the Sharīʿa depend on him.43
If it is said: why is it not sufficient to appoint a ruler in every region, or why is it obligatory to appoint one who has the general authority (al-riyāsa al-ʿāmma)?” we say: because that would lead to conflict and animosity, which would lead to the corruption of the affairs of religion as well as this world, as we witness in our own times.44
Appointing a leader is obligatory. Its mandatory nature is known through revealed law by the consensus of the Companions and the generation of the Followers. It is so because the Companions of the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) hastened, upon his death, to pledge allegiance and submit consideration of their affairs to Abu Bakr (May God be pleased with him). And it was thus in every age thereafter, and the matter was established as consensus indicating the obligation of appointing a leader.46
The major imama (khilāfa) is the right of general disposal over the people. Its investigation is in Kalam (i.e., theology) and establishing it is the most important of obligations. Hence, they (the Companions) gave it priority over the burial of the Possessor of Miraclesﷺ. 49
ʿAli said, “People must have leadership (imāra), be it pious or impious.” They asked, “O Commander of the Faithful, we understand the pious, but why if it is impious?” He said, “By it [legal] ḥudūd are established, public streets are protected, jihād is made against the enemy, and the spoils are divided.53
It must be known that the governmental authority (wilāya) of people’s affairs is one of the greatest obligations of religion, and, in fact, the religion cannot be established without it, for the well-being of the Children of Adam cannot be secured except by their coming together to fulfill each other’s needs. . . This is why all things that [God] has obligated, such as jihād, justice, establishment of the pilgrimage, Friday congregations, Eid festivals, aiding the oppressed, and the establishment of God’s ḥudūd can only be established with power and authority.54
- stands in the Prophet’s place, but is neither a prophet nor infallible, and commands the allegiance of the entire Muslim community, and
- governs the religious and worldly affairs of the Prophet’s community, which effectively means that he protects the religion, defends borders, upholds law and order, and (re)distributes resources.
Caliphate is not kingship
You O Arabs will do well so long as you consult when your chief dies, for when it is taken by the sword, they become kings (mulūk), their wrath is like the wrath of kings and their pleasure is the pleasure of kings.58
It is so because kingship (mulk) is not in our Law (sharʿ); rather, it is in the law of those before us, as God mentioning His favors upon the Israelites. . . . He [God] has not legitimized for us anything but khilāfa.59
The question arises whether kingship (mulk) is lawful and the Prophetic caliphate simply preferred or whether it is unlawful and may only be justified in the absence of the knowledge [that is it obligatory] or the power to establish the caliphate.
In our view, kingship is essentially unlawful, and the obligation is to establish a prophetic caliphate. This is because the Prophet ﷺ said, “You must follow my practice and the practice of the rightly guided caliphs after me; stick to it and hold fast to it. Refrain from (unjustified) innovations and remember that every (such) innovation is an error” ... This hadith is therefore a command; it exhorts us to follow necessarily the practice of the Caliphate (of the Prophet), enjoins us to abide by it, and warns us against deviation from it. It is a command from him and definitely makes the establishment of the caliphate a duty ... Again, the fact that the Prophet ﷺ expressed his dislike for the kingship that would follow the prophetic caliphate proves that kingship lacks in something that is compulsory in religion... Those who justify monarchy argue from the words of the Prophet ﷺ to Muʿawiya, “If you acquire kingship, be good and kind.”60 But there is no (cogent) argument in this ... The establishment of the caliphate is an obligatory duty, and exemption from it may be permitted only on grounds of necessity.61
Did the Prophet ﷺ establish a state?
- the imperative to be a distinct community whose members were forbidden to make compromising alliances with outsiders;
- the command to make war, peace, and political treaties as a sovereign community;
- obeying no other law but God’s, hence requiring the community to be legally sovereign;
- upholding the Law in all areas of collective life, including the penal code, marital and social life, commercial and financial regulations, and so on; and finally,
- a distinct “foreign policy” as the Prophet ﷺ dispatched epistles to the neighboring sovereigns and emperors (which implied the obligation on his successors to follow up on them), in addition to his punitive campaigns against claimants of prophecy like Ṭalḥa, Musaylima, and other tribes that acted treacherously and rebelliously after entering Islam,68 and his command to prepare a punitive campaign on the Roman border just before his return to his Lord, and so on.
Longing for the caliphate
The present: Failing states
I think everyone is rational to be pessimistic about the prospects for the region. None of these problems have a short-term solution.76
Continuing local opposition, whether on religious grounds or others, to the settlement of 1922 or to the fundamental assumptions upon which it was based, explains the characteristic feature of the region's politics: that in the Middle East there is no sense of legitimacy—no agreement on rules of the game—and no belief, universally shared in the region, that within whatever boundaries, the entities that call themselves countries or the men who claim to be rulers are entitled to recognition as such. In that sense, successors to the Ottoman sultans have not yet been permanently installed.77
The secular theology of the modern state
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were transferred from [Christian] theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.84
Modern Islamist discourses assume the modern state to be a neutral tool of governance, one that can be harnessed to perform certain functions according to the choices and dictates of its leaders. [It can be turned into] … an Islamic state implementing the values and ideals enshrined in the Qur’an and those that the Prophet had once realized in his “mini-state” of Medina. ... [This is not so.] It inherently [emphasis in the original] produces certain distinctive effects that are political, social, economic, cultural, epistemic, and, no less, psychological, which is to say that the state fashions particular knowledge systems that in turn determine and shape the landscape of individual and collective subjectivity and thus much of the meaning of its subjects’ lives.86
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood: Indeed, the world is run by little else.88
Given that establishing a rightly-guided or complete caliphate is impossible under the current conditions, there is no alternative to establishing incomplete or deficient Islamic government (ḥukūma) on the basis of necessity that the current circumstances impose upon the Islamic world today. But such a system (niẓām) must be considered deficient and temporary … The ideal caliphate system of the future must be flexible, for as we have seen, the sharīʿa does not impose a specific [administrative] form for governance at all.89
- Unification of the Islamic world;
- application of Islamic law, and
- certain religious and political features. These he further elaborates as follows:
- Separation of powers: as history and experience show that concentration of power in the hand of one person or body leads to the domination of the political over the religious and moral.
- Legal reform: the traditional Islamic legal system (outside of ritual and religious aspects) had led to stagnation, which makes it necessary to engage in serious research and effect an intellectual renaissance of sorts before applying it in practice.
- Decentralization and localism: history and experience show that the unity of the Islamic world cannot be maintained stably in a highly centralized state, nor is that desirable from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence; any such attempt will have to be decentralized with a large measure of freedom given to each region to govern itself.90
1 Diyar Guldogan, “Turkish Republic continuation of Ottoman Empire,” Anadolu Agency, 10 Oct 18, http://aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/turkish-republic-continuation-of-ottoman-empire/1059924 (Accessed 19 Dec 2018). See also, Rashid Dar, “The Other C-word: Caliphate,” http://ciceromagazine.com/features/the-other-c-word-caliphate/
2 Azadeh Moaveni, “The Lingering Dream of an Islamic State,” New York Times, 12 Jan 2018.
4 This observation was made by the Jewish-American constitutional scholar at Harvard University, Noah Feldman, in his The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.
5 John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (W. W. Norton & Company, 2009): “The new democracy was a bastard. Its creation was unintended. Its survival at no point in time guaranteed. It was not inevitable” (161).
6 Sheldon S. Wolin and Nicholas Xenos (eds.), Fugitive Democracy and Other Essays (Princeton University Press, 2016).
7 This statement appears almost verbatim five times in the Qur’an, see, e.g., 2:216.
8 This is a small sample of such reports, notwithstanding the wishful exaggerations of western journalists: “Despots are pushing the Arab world to become more secular,” The Economist, 2 Nov 2017, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/11/02/despots-are-pushing-the-arab-world-to-become-more-secular; “The Arab world in seven charts: Are Arabs turning their backs on religion?” 24 Jun 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48703377.
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.(Touchstone, 1993/1996).
10 Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad Vs. McWorld (Ballantine Books, 1996).
11 John Gray, John, Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought (Polity Press, 1997).
12 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy ( Princeton University Press, 1999).
13 For instance, Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies (Free Press, 1995); Luigi Padula, End of the Nation-State: A Historical Perspective (2015).
14 Peter Dockrill, Business Insider, 6/26, https://www.businessinsider.com/climate-apartheid-united-nations-report-2019-6 (Accessed 7/4/19).)
15 This argument has been made in Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (Columbia University Press, 2012); here Hallaq argues that the modern state is not a neutral arrangement that can be transformed at will, as Islamic reformers had initially thought, but one that is essentially amoral and incompatible with any historically recognizable form of Islam. Andrew F. March, in his more recent The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought (Harvard University Press, 2019), tells the story of the failure of attempts to Islamize the state in the twentieth century, and points to reasons that confirm Hallaq’s thesis: “It is a short step from the prerevolutionary ideological claim that ‘the state must be run by the sacred law’ to ‘whatever the state requires for its defense, preservation, and welfare is what the sacred law is’” (225).
16 Salman Sayyid, Recalling the Caliphate (Hurst & Co. 2014), 190–911.
17 Richard A. Shweder, “Geertz’s Challenge: Is It Possible to Be a Robust Cultural Pluralist and a Dedicated Political Liberal at the Same Time?,” in Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey (eds.), Law without Nations (Stanford Law Books, 2010), 226.
18 Columbia University Press, 2018.
19 Arjun Appaduri, “Across the World, Genocidal States Are Attacking Muslims. Is Islam Really Their Target?,” Scroll.in, 22 May 2018, https://scroll.in/article/879591/from-israel-to-myanmar-genocidal-projects-are-less-about-religion-and-more-about-predatory-states (Accessed 29 May 2018).
20 The “War on Terror,” admittedly, has also been successful in making willing subjects out of Muslims. Thus, Sayyid, Recalling the Caliphate, 189-90: “Muslims have been the most visible targets of the War on Terror; they have been conscripted into an emerging political consciousness, by the never-ending war. They trade stories comedic (‘flying while been Muslim’), horrific (the visceral sadism in the force-feeding of the hunger strikers in Guantanamo) and heroic (daily grind of living under occupations in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Burma). The conversations of the ummah are now irredeemably coloured by the War on Terror as Kemalists and Islamists adjust to the banality of its execution.” Many thanks to Mohammed El-Sayed Bushra for this reference.
21 Times of Israel, 9 July 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-future-peace-deal-with-palestinians-must-include-arab-israelis/
22 This hadith is reported through two companions, Thawbān (Abu Dawūd # 4297) and Abū Hurayra, (Musnad Aḥmad), and regarded as sound.
23 Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, 72.3.
24 Azad Essa, “Muslims being 'erased' from Central African Republic,” Aljazeera, 31 Jul 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/amnesty-muslims-erased-central-african-republic-150731083248166.html (Accessed 19 Dec 2018).
25 Yale University Press, 2017.
26 David Wasserstein, “How Islam Saved the Jews,” https://kavvanah.wordpress.com/2012/06/04/how-islam-saved-the-jews-david-wasserstein/ (Accessed 7/4/19).)
27 Muslim # 1342.
28 For the Orientalist literature, the confusion has been spread since Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph (1986). For contemporary Muslim literature, an endless stream of literature is being generated that describes humans as God’s vicegerents. Its earliest case may have been Abu al-Aʿla al-Mawdudi’s popular Urdu exegesis of the Qur’an, Tafhim al-Qur’an.
29 For a study of this phenomenon, see Andrew F. March, The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought (Harvard University Press, 2019).
30 See the comparison chart in David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (2014), 272.
31 Noah Feldman, Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (2008), xxxix.
32 Hüseyin Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in the Ottoman Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 2018).
33 For more on the millet system, see Teseneem Alkiek, “Tolerance, Minorities, and Ideological Perspectives,” https://yaqeeninstitute.org/tesneem-alkiek/tolerance-minorities-and-ideological-perspectives/
34 Wadad Kadi and Aram Shahin, “caliph, caliphate,” in Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 85.
35 Even though belief in (as a result of the dispute about the appointment of) the right imam was the defining problem for the Shiʿa, the list of the five well-known beliefs for the Imami Shiʿa did not become settled until the fifth/eleventh century; see Mohammed Ali Amir-Moezzi, “Early Shīʿī Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, 82-3.
36 Patricia Crone, “Ibadis,” in G. Bowering (ed.), Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 2013), 230.
37 For a study of al-Juwayni’s political thought, see my article “Political Metaphors and Concepts in the Writings of an Eleventh-Century Sunni Scholar, Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 26.1-2 (2016): 7-18. For an overview of the entire classical period and Ibn Taymiyya’s innovative political ideas, see my monograph Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
38 After a clear text in the Qur’an or a multiple corroborated (mutawātir) hadith, that is. Al-Juwaynī, Ghiyāthī, 39-43.
39 Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined.
40 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal fī al-milal wa-l-ahwā’ wa-l-niḥal, 4:87.
41 The Muʿtazila and the Kharijites generally uphold the obligation; only a handful of Muʿtazila, such as Hishām al-Fuwātī, who argued that no caliphate can be established in civil war, thus denying ʿAli’s caliphate. The Najadāt were short-lived fanatic Kharijites who excommunicated all other Muslims, and who in reality always had an imam, but denied the obligation of having one.
42 The wording in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim is “Whoever dies without giving allegiance dies the death of pre-Islamic ignorance” (Muslim #4793).
43 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 1430/2009), 353–54.
45 Ibid., 355.
46 “Inna naṣb al-imām wājib qad ʿurifa wujūbuh fī al-sharʿ bi-ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥāba wa-l-tābiʿīn,” Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, ed. Muḥammad al-Iskandarānī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī,2006), 186 (Bk I, sec. 3, ch. 26); compare the translation by F. Rosenthal, abridged by N. J. Dawood in Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton University Press, 1967), 156.
47 H. A. R. Gibb, Studies on Islamic Civilization (Princeton Legacy Library, 1982 [orig. 1962]), 173.
48 For a summary of these views, see Ṣādiq Nuʿmān,al-Khilāfa al-Islāmiyya (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2004), 26–27; ʿAbdallāh al-Dumayjī, al-Imāma al-ʿuẓmā ʿinda ahl al-sunnah wa-l-jamāʿa (Riyadh: Dār Ṭayba, 1987), 45ff.
49 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ḥaṣkafī (d. 1088/1677), al-Durr al-Mukhtār, 75.
50 The helpful notion of ‘problem space’ is proposed by anthropologist David Scott in his Conscripts of Modernity (Duke University Press, 2004).
51 See the section below entitled “Did the Prophet Establish a State?”
52 Al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 3:372.
53 Al-Bayhaqī, Shuʿab al-īmān, 5:75114 vols., ed. Mukhtār al-Nadwī (Riyadh: Maktaba al-Rushd, 2003), 10:15; Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna, 1:146.
54 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya , 161–62.
55 Al-Māwardī, Aḥkām, 27.
56 For details of the classical models of the caliphate and its political theory, see my Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
57 For a discussion of the “strikingly egalitarian” nature of early Islamic society and their Qur’anic inspiration, “accentuated … by its conjunction with … Arab tribalism,” see L. Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1-6; esp. 4.
58 Bukhari #4359.
59 Al-Kattānī, 99. The same view is adopted by Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 35:33.
60 Scholars, including al-Dhahabī, al-Bayhaqī, and Ibn Kathīr, all agree on the weakness of this hadith. See, e.g., al-Dhahabī, Siyar 3:131.
61 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā, 35:22.
62 Michaelangelo Guida, “Seyyid Bey and the Abolition of the Caliphate,” Middle Eastern Studies 44.2 (2008), 275–89.
63 Speaking of how quickly Atatürk killed off the religious scholars and transformed an entire culture, Hitler wrote admiringly in 1938 that the Turkish despot “was the first to show that it is possible to mobilize and regenerate the resources that a country has lost.” “Atatürk was a teacher,” Hitler said. “Mussolini was his first and I his second student.” Halil Karaveli, “Hitler’s Infatuation with Atatürk Revisited,” https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/367-hitler%E2%80%99s-infatuation-with-atat%C3%BCrk-revisited.html (Accessed 7/4/19). See also Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017), 131.
64 James Broucek, “The Controversy of Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd Al-Raziq,” Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Florida, 2012), 128.
65 Those who wrote refutations were the leading scholars of the twentieth century: Aḥmad Shākir, Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī, Muḥammad Khiḍr Ḥusayn, Rashīd Riḍā, Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr. See Muḥammad ʿImāra’s Maʿrikat al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1989) for an analysis of the controversy in Arabic and a detailed presentation of the original arguments and their refutations.
66 Quoted in Souad T. Ali, A Religion Not a State (The University of Utah Press, 2009), 73. See also James Broucek, “The Controversy,” 183; and Muḥammad ʿImāra, Maʿrikat al-Islām.
67 For the historical evolution of the tafsir opinions on this verse, see my book Politics, Law, 52n59.
68 Ṭabarī, Tārīkh (Dār al-Turāth), 3:186-7.
69In all likelihood, ʿAbd al-Rāziq had not read Juwaynī’s Ghiyāth al-umam (which would not have been available in published form), Ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāj, and most other classical works on the subject available to us, with the exception of al-Māwardī and Ibn Khaldūn, whom he cites. In personal communication, Prof. Ahmed El Shamsy of the University of Chicago informs me that whereas Ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāj had been published by Būlāq publishers in 1903-5, al-Juwaynī’s Ghiyāth would have been unavailable in published form at the time.
70 ʿAbd al-Rāaziq, al-Islām wa-Uuṣūl al-Ḥukm, quoted in Broucek, “The Controversy,” 183; also ʿImāra, Maʿraikat al-Islām, 395ff.
71 Mona Hassan, Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History (Princeton University Press, 2017).
72 Reza Pankhurst’s The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 2013).
73 Jacob Landau, Pan-Islamism: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
74 See, e.g., Sayyid, Recalling the Caliphate, 189.
75 See, in particular, Sayyid, Recalling the Caliphate, chap. 5.
76 Justine Marrozi, “Forget Lawrence of Arabia, here’s the real history of the Middle East and World War I,” The National, 26 Feb 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/the-long-read-forget-lawrence-of-arabia-here-s-the-real-history-of-the-middle-east-and-world-war-1-1.640119 (Accessed 18 Dec 2018)
77 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 564.
78 Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State.
79 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State (1996); see also, Sayyid, Recalling, 146, who names the contemporary Arab governments ‘the Mukhabarat state.’
80 See, for instance, Michael Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative Perspective (Princeton University Press, 2014); Shadi Hamid, Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World (St. Martin’s Press, 2016).
81 A good reference in this regard, showing how the eventual triumph of the nation-state model was not inevitable, is Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton University Press, 2006). Thanks to Mohammed El-Sayed Bushra for this reference.
82 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1978), ix–x.
83 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Basil Blackwell, 1990), 1–2.
84 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (MIT Press, 1985), 36.
85 The modern state, furthermore, is a national state, one that presumably limits its loyalty—its “avowal and disavowal”—by national boundaries.
86 Hallaq, The Impossible State, 155-6.
87 Ibid. Citing and building on these studies, Hallaq has argued that the doctrine of the separation of powers is ineffective in the modern state in general, and this inefficacy has been thoroughly documented in the most institutionally advanced democracy, the United States (see chap. 3).
88 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Harvest/Harcourt Inc., 1964; orig. 1935), ch. 24, 383.
89 ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, quoted in Muḥammad ʿImāra (ed.), Islāmiyāt al-Sanhūrī Bāshā, vol. 1, 335–37.
91 George Will, The Conservative Sensibility (2019), 157.
92 For the kinds of conversation in political theory that these reflections require, see Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2003).
93 This hadith is multiply reported (mutāwatir), on the authority of many companions including ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib as recorded in, e.g., al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, Bukhari 6930 and Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 1066.