Slavery and Emancipation in the Sharia: The Islamic Framework for Ethical Treatment of Slaves in the Minhāj fī shuʿab al-īmān of al-Ḥalīmī

The topic of slavery is not an easy one. In part this is because many today live in societies still shaped by slavery’s racial hierarchies and inequalities. But it is also because thinking about slavery in any depth involves serious dilemmas about morality, identity, and beliefs. Today slavery is seen as an intrinsic evil—maybe the greatest evil—throughout time and space. “No evil more monstrous has ever existed upon the earth,” said the English poet Samuel Coleridge (d. 1834). As the 2001 Durban Declaration stated, slavery is “a crime against humanity and should always have been so.” But slavery is also an institution that, in one form or another, existed in every civilization until quite recently. This means nothing in and of itself. Lots of bad institutions have existed. What does mean something is that slavery is something that every major religious and philosophical tradition considered uncontroversial, proper, and even natural until, at the very earliest, the 1700s. And it was not until the 1800s that the morality of slavery per se became a widely debated question. Even then, the moral debate over slavery was limited for decades to the industrialized societies of Western Europe and America.

So we are confronted with a serious dilemma: if slavery is an intrinsic crime against humanity, why did Plato, Aristotle, Moses, Jesus, the Buddha, Confucian and Hindu sages, the Bible, and the Qur’an have no problem with it? As one British theologian wrote in the early 1800s, if slavery were an evil no matter where and when, how could the God of the Bible ever have allowed it? Either these enlightened hearts and minds did not know slavery was evil or they did not care. Either we question the intrinsic moral evil of slavery or we question the qualifications of those figures of authority and those revealed texts. One might object that maybe these prophets and philosophers had been unable to speak out against slavery because of its prevalence in society. It would have been too disruptive. But aren’t prophets usually disruptive? As one slave owner replied to an American abolitionist, was he really going to claim that Jesus lacked the courage of his convictions to, at the very least, declare that slavery was wrong? 

Put simply, if slavery has always been a grotesque evil, then it’s a grotesque evil in which the totality of mankind’s pre-nineteenth-century heritage was intimately implicated. Put in the idiom of statue debates, if you refuse to honor a person who condoned evil, then that means canceling every thinker, leader, and saint prior to 1700. If you want to honor those figures, you have to reconsider the categorical severity with which slavery in history is judged.

One way out of the predicament is to say that there are different kinds of slavery. This is undeniably correct and is obvious to both experts and non-experts alike. For example, Sokullu Mehmet Pasha (d. 1579) was the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire during the reigns of three sultans, one of the wealthiest men in the realm and married to the sultan’s daughter. In the 1700s in Jamaica, by contrast, a slave named Derby toiled on a British sugar plantation, where enslaved people from Africa were worked so brutally that they lived for only around seven years after arriving. As a punishment for eating some sugar, Derby’s overseer had him whipped and then had a device placed between his jaws to keep them open while another slave was forced to defecate in his mouth. As far as I know, such treatment was unthinkable not just in the Ottoman Empire but in the Muslim world overall. Both Sokullu Mehmet and Derby were slaves, in that they were both property owned by another person. But not only was their treatment so different that comparing them seems almost immoral, they also lived under dramatically different regimes of rights and laws. The British laws governing the treatment of slaves in Jamaica offered pitifully little protection for slaves. The Ḥanafī law of the Ottoman Empire, however, held that ill treatment of slaves, such as any physical punishment that would leave scars, could be grounds for forced manumission. What’s more, slaves in the Ottoman Empire continuously went to court for relief against treatment they disliked. 

The fact of the matter is that slavery in the European colonies of the Americas and the slave trade that supplied them were exceptionally brutal and shockingly inhumane phenomena. Not only was the violence singular, the racial justifications for enslaving Africans were unusual and offensive. It is no surprise that the earliest anti-slavery writings produced in the Americas (indeed, very nearly the first in the world) came from people with direct experience with the Atlantic slave trade. And the earliest humanitarian objections to slavery in the Americas came from a Dominican friar, Bartolomé de las Casas (d. 1566), who had never been troubled by the slavery he’d seen in his native Spain but was utterly shocked by how the Spanish treated their Native American and African slaves in the Americas. The collection of slaves by European traders on the African coast and then their transport to the Americas were horrifically violent. To my knowledge, there is no premodern equivalent of such treatment in Islamic civilization. (Some European reports about slave raids by Arab and Berber raiders into the Sahel in the nineteenth century come close. But it should be noted that the intra-Muslim-world slave trade intensified greatly in the nineteenth century, and this was accompanied by alarming illegalities and abuses such as the rampant enslavement of other Muslims). 

In contrast to the colonial Americas, slavery in Islamic civilization as well as in many other times and places was much more diverse and sometimes comparatively mild. From the ancient Near East to medieval Europe, a surprising number of people voluntarily became slaves (what would you do if you could avoid starvation or constant fear by offering yourself and your family as slaves to someone who would feed and protect you?). One of the most unusual features of slavery in the European colonies in the Americas (with the exception of Brazil) was that slavery was based on racial phenotype, namely the physical features that the powerful in those societies had decided indicated African descent. For most of world history, on the other hand, slaves were either racially and ethnically the same as those around them or were from some outside group that, though seen as other or the enemy, might not look any different. Finally, while slaveholding states in North America passed laws increasingly restricting the possibility of setting slaves free, slaves in ancient Rome or the Islamic world were very often freed after a few years of service. While freed slaves and free Black people in the US were in constant danger of (re)enslavement because their appearance marked them as part of the slave class, freed slaves in ancient Rome or Islamic civilization had no distinctive look and could prosper in free society.

Asserting that slavery has existed in many shapes and, more importantly, in varying degrees of severity has long been a recognized means of resolving the moral conundrum of slavery and squaring the honoring of revealed laws with our moral disapproval of terrible treatment. Christian philosophers going back to Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) stated that, while the Bible and Church law allowed slavery, they did not allow the total control and unaccountable domination of one person by another. So why is this not a more acceptable resolution to the moral conundrum of slavery in world history today?

Perhaps the main reason is that abolitionism, namely the movement to end slavery as an institution, which emerged in Britain and Northern American colonies like Pennsylvania in the late 1700s, was built on a denial of such degrees and distinctions. This was due firstly to the sources available for making moral arguments. Every pillar of Western normative culture, from the Bible to Greek philosophy and Roman law, had been totally supportive of slavery. The earliest anti-slavery polemics, such as The Selling of Joseph (1700) by Samuel Sewell of Massachusetts, got around this by equating the enslavement of Africans and their export to America with man-stealing, i.e., the illegal enslavement of someone one could not legally enslave. Though slavery was allowed in the Old and New Testaments as well as in European legal traditions, these sources also prohibited enslaving those one was not allowed to enslave (See Leviticus 25:39 and hadiths against enslaving free people). This was a questionable association, however, since Europeans had long justified their enslavement of Africans precisely with reference to Roman law allowing the enslavement of heathen captives (this was even allowed by the Father of Liberty, John Locke [d. 1704], who held that, since African tribes allegedly did not respect the normal rules of international law, they could rightfully be enslaved). Second, abolitionists had to deny distinctions within slavery because this was one of the first counter arguments that supporters of slavery would deploy. The slavery they were defending was paternal and beneficial to the enslaved, they claimed, not like the cruel and depraved domination of Roman slavery. This anxiety around recognizing the obvious varying conditions and levels of degradation in slavery out of fear that it would be used to morally exonerate forms as slavery seen as ‘better’ than others is still present in American discussions of slavery even at an academic level. Daina Ramey Berry, an accomplished historian of slavery in America, once corrected herself in an interview in which she was asked to compare the conditions of slaves in US cities and the countryside. She said she would only note differences in the conditions but would not, as a matter of principle, say that one was “better” than the other. But clearly some slaves lived in better conditions than others, and some forms of slavery have clearly been morally worse than others.  

The only moral justification for denying that grades of treatment or differences in condition should be accounted for in moral evaluations of slavery is that there is something about the concept of slavery per se that is so morally reprehensible that it does not afford any internal distinction. One could argue, for example, that losing your freedom or being considered property is so intrinsically heinous that there is no space for such nuance. But this could not be further from the truth. Every mode by which slavery has been defined in world history is so abstract and dependent on context that any accurate description requires precisely such detail and distinction. For the past three thousand years, scholars from ancient Rome to modern social scientists have defined slavery as one or more of the following:

1. the loss of freedom;
2. being the property of another person;
3. existing in a position of extreme marginalization or vulnerability in a society; and/or
4. working under compulsion and the threat of violence.

Each of these definitions of slavery might function very well in a particular society or a certain tradition. For example, it is clear what it meant to be free as opposed to a slave in Antebellum Virginia. It is fairly clear how we understand compulsion and the threat of violence in modern-day labor abuse. But if one tries to apply these definitions across civilizations (like between the American South and the Ottoman Empire) or across time, they are too abstract to hold coherent meaning. If being unfree means you can’t do certain things at all or without your master’s permission, what are those things? Where is the line between what a free person can do and what an unfree person can’t? Even within the Shariah tradition the answer can be surprisingly hard to pin down. In the Mālikī school, slaves can own property; in the other schools of law, they cannot. If being a slave is being human property, what does that mean? There is nothing close to a consistent definition of property across space and time. In a manner that sounds like how we think today about our rights over our property, early Roman law allowed masters to beat or kill their slaves with impunity, as if they were physical objects. But the Roman head of household could, according to the law, do that to their own free children as well. If being a slave means an extremely marginal existence in a society, societies differ dramatically from one another in where their margins are and what they look like. In the early 1700s many serfs in Russia voluntarily became slaves because, while serfs had to pay taxes, slaves did not. In medieval Sind, the free untouchables who cleared garbage and waste were even more socially despised and marginal than slaves. Finally, if being a slave means being forced to live and work under compulsion and the threat of violence, what constitutes compulsion and threats of violence in different societies differs tremendously. According to definitions of Modern-Day slavery, most people in human history lived under unacceptable levels of unfreedom and coercion. In Roman North Africa, all members of the household, free and slave, lived in a system of authority structured and enforced by violence under the male head of household. Indentured servants in colonial Maryland and Virginia were not slaves, and they willingly entered their state of temporary bondage. But if they ran away, the punishment was mutilation in Virginia and death in Maryland, punishments so severe that the Shariah prohibited them for slaves. 

Acknowledging that some forms of slavery merit significantly more moral condemnation than others, however, does not fully resolve our moral quandary. Few would feel comfortable admitting to the moral acceptability of any kind of slavery today. But, then again, many in the modern, urban West would feel morally uncomfortable with how most free people have been treated in world history. Combined with the timing of when abolitionism emerged, this fact provides a crucial insight into why we today feel the way we do about slavery. Boiled down, the most commonly accepted view for how slavery was ended is that, around 1700, some people in Britain and its northern colonies in America realized that slavery was morally wrong. They convinced others of their views, and gradually this position became dominant first in Britain and then in the northern United States. From there it spread throughout Europe and finally around the world. Unless one posits that those individuals were someone endowed with unique moral sensibilities, however, there is no way to explain why such a moral awakening occurred. Why would humanity become convinced that something it had done for so long and with the full approval of its greatest moral authorities was evil?

As scholars have pointed out, it is no coincidence that significant condemnations of slavery in and of itself and calls to end slavery as an institution appeared first in the places where societies first industrialized and achieved unprecedented wealth without reliance on slave labor, namely Britain and what became the northern US. The spread of industrial technology, which allowed humans to move goods, plough, and produce without relying on the labor of animals and other humans, meant that slavery became economically obsolete. As it did so, people developed more refined sensibilities to what was considered excessively cruel or exploitative treatment. Indeed, Aristotle had predicted this when he said that slaves would only be dispensed with when looms powered themselves. What this means is that, despite how deeply we feel that the evil of slavery is a moral reality that has always been true and always will be, our moral sentiments about slavery are more the results of technological and economic change than some sudden, principled enlightenment. This does not mean that our conviction that slavery is wrong is somehow trivial or less meaningful. Many of our moral beliefs are the products of social custom, which is in turn strongly shaped by economic and technological realities. The Shariah empowers custom as a major source of law and morality, provided it does not transgress the clear boundaries set by revelation.

As with the rest of the world until the early modern period, slavery was an economic and social reality in the world in which the Prophet ﷺ lived. The Qur’an and the Prophet’s teachings, however, introduced several important and unprecedented reforms to the laws and customs of slavery as it existed in the Near Eastern world. Debt slavery was prohibited, as was the practice of selling oneself or one’s family into slavery. The only legal way in which a person could be enslaved was if they were a non-Muslim, outside the Abode of Islam, captured in war. While the children born of a male owner and his female slave had been illegitimate and/or a slave in the Persian, Arabian and Roman traditions, Islam declared those children to be not only free but also of the same social standing as the children born of a free wife. The result was that, while Thomas Jefferson’s children with his slave woman Sally Hemings (d. 1835) were considered black and unfree and could never be part of the American elite, twenty (or perhaps twenty-two) out of twenty-four Abbasid caliphs during Baghdad’s heyday were born of slave mothers. The mothers of almost all the Ottoman sultans were slave concubines as well. Although this was tragically ignored by many Muslim scholars, who instead followed the Biblical tradition on this matter, the Prophet ﷺ also demonstrated the falsity of the Curse of Ham legend found in the Book of Genesis and elaborated in late antique Christian and Jewish tradition. This legend stated that Noah had cursed the descendants (or some of them) of his son Ham to have black skin and serve as slaves. The Prophet  explained that the variety of human skin color comes from the multicolored soil from which God had created the first human.

The most distinct feature of how the Qur’an and the Sunnah treat slavery, however, is an obsession with emancipating slaves. Indeed, I know of no scripture that is more emphatic on this topic. The Qur'an instructs owners to allow their slaves to buy back their freedom on installments (24:33) and directs part of the Zakat monies collected to aid in purchasing slaves’ freedom (2:177, 9:60). God describes freeing slaves as a feature of the path of believers (90:12-16) and even requires it as an expiation for some sins and the violation of some oaths (5:89, 58:3). As al-Ḥalīmī’s text below demonstrates exhaustively, the mandate to free slaves was even more prominent and repeated in the Prophet’s sayings. As Muslim scholars explained, the command to free slaves stemmed from the fact that God “wants freedom,” because all humans are free by nature and because there is something irreverent about one person being the master of another when, as the Prophet explained, “you are all the slaves of God.” It was recognized already in the 1200s that emancipating slaves was one of the aims (maqāṣid) of the Shariah. Moreover, though Muslim scholars did not declare slavery evil (essentially no one did until the 1700s), they always considered it harmful (ḍarar). This was, in part, because it prevented a person from being fully in control of their actions or benefiting from the fruits of their labor. 

If the Qur’an and the Sunnah were so strident in their call to emancipate slaves, if one person being the master of another when God is the Lord of all militates against the natural order, and if Muslim scholars recognized that slavery was harmful, why didn’t God simply abolish slavery in the Qur’an? West-is-best chauvinists like Jordan Petersen and Douglas Murray boast that it was the West that fought to abolish slavery, not the Muslim world. Why is this?

The answer is that no one, not Europeans or other Christians, called for the abolition of slavery as an institution until the 1700s. It was not economically conceivable for dependent human labor to be removed from life’s equation at a large scale until fossil fuels replaced their energy. As the historian Howard Temperley wrote, until the late 1700s “slavery was accepted with that fatalism which men commonly reserve for aspects of nature which, whether they are celebrated or deplored, have to be borne. To argue against slavery was to argue against the facts of life.” Calls to abolish slavery emerged in the North Atlantic world not because of some inherent genius in Christianity or the West (both Christianity and Western philosophy had long been totally supportive of slavery) but because industrial life began in that area and the particular type of slavery prevalent in the Americas was uniquely horrific.

Muslims encountered abolitionism the same way everyone else in the soon-to-be-colonized world did: through European diplomatic power and colonial endeavors. But with social and economic change Muslims came to adopt the same sentiments as their Western contemporaries. As the Mālikī and Ḥanafī muftis of Tunis made clear in their approval of the Ottoman governor’s decision to ban slavery in the province in 1846, it was well within the power of a Muslim ruler to restrict slavery in an effort to achieve the Shariah aim of emancipation. Taking or owning slaves is not required or even recommended in Islamic law, so restricting or banning it falls within the realm of what Muslim scholars have called “restricting the permissible (taqyīd al-mubāḥ),” in which a Muslim government restricts what would otherwise be permissible because of some common good. As the Tunisian scholar Muḥammad Bayram al-Khāmis (d. 1889) wrote in his explanation of the Tunis decree, when a Muslim ruler restricts the permissible for the cause of the common good, heeding this rule becomes a religious obligation. Muslims must obey the abolition of slavery “in secret and in the open, and they must know that owning [a slave] is invalid.” This is what the Shariah teaches, Bayram added, and “disobeying the Sacred Law (sharʿ) is truly prohibited.” 

Al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥalīmī (d. 403/1012) was a respected scholar and Hadith master of tenth-century Khurasan and Transoxiana. Born in Jurjan, on the humid and verdant southeast coast of the Caspian Sea, he studied with Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī scholars across the Black Sands Desert in Bukhara. He spent most of his career, however, in the rolling hills and caravan cities of Khurasan and became a respected representative of the Shāfiʿī school of law, Hadith scholarship, and Ashʿarī theology. His one surviving book, the Kitāb al-Minhāj fī shuʿab al-īmān (The Proper Path on the Branches of Faith) was an exposition of the components of faith based on the Prophet’s hadith that faith is divided into seventy-some branches.

Whether the fault lies with the manuscript copyist or the editor of the book (only looking at the manuscripts used in this publication could give an inkling of which), this is perhaps the most error-replete text I have ever seen. Words and phrases are regularly misread/miscopied. I have included my own remarks underlined to note when a serious instance of this occurs.

God Most High has made manumission obligatory in expiations (kaffārāt), as He did in providing food and clothing as well as fasting. And He made it an obligation as a redemption (fidya) for souls if they are killed wrongly. This indicates that manumission is a mode of virtuous conduct and of increasing in closeness to Him whose name is magnified even if no crime has been previously committed, just as one engages in other modes of virtuous conduct that we have mentioned without any wrong having been done. And God most glorified said, “But you have not taken the path of ascent. And what will convey to you what the path of ascent is? It is freeing a neck, or feeding on the day of hunger an orphan near of kin or a poor wretch in the dust. Then will they be one of those who believe and enjoin upon one another patience and enjoin upon one another compassion” (90:11-17). And His words “But you have not taken the path of ascent” are words of rebuke and deeming someone tardy, like His words “But you have not taken the path of ascent” (sic), meaning the ascending path of the virtuous about which God most noble and glorified said, “I will exhaust him with the steepest path” (74:17), meaning: Let them do what is easy for them to undertake.

And it is possible that what is intended by the path of ascent is all that lies in one’s future in terms of resurrection, accountability  [on the Day of Judgment] and recompense, which one does not know whether it be goodly or evil, as if one is saying to someone, “There are between me and this matter steep paths (ʿiqāb, pl. of ʿaqaba),” if attaining that thing is far off and impossible to accomplish. So then how is it that this path of ascent is made easy? [God] mentions: freeing a neck and feeding the needy, thus showing that each of these is a virtuous act bringing proximity [to God].

It has been transmitted from the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that a man said to him, “O Messenger of God, show me a deed that will gain me entrance to the Garden.” He replied, “Manumit a neck and free a soul (nasama).” The man asked, “Aren’t these two, O Messenger of God, the same thing?” He answered, “Manumitting a neck is if one merely frees the person, but the soul is that one also supports them [financially].” And if the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, had not explicitly mentioned manumission as an answer to the man’s question about a deed leading to entry into the Garden, and had limited it to a command to free a neck, that alone would have constituted a great tiding and demonstrated the substantial reward for manumitting slaves. So how much more if one offers aid in doing so? This is due to the fact that while contributing to the cost of purchasing a slave for emancipation guarantees entry into the Garden, the act of freeing a slave is even more virtuous. [I think there is an instance of dittography here in the printed text; I have omitted it]. And God knows best.

And it has come from the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that he said, “Whoever frees a soul, for every limb freed of the slave, God will free from the Fire a limb of them that freed them.” And this is the most extensive manner of encouraging people to manumit slaves. And it has also come from him that he said, “O Muʿādh, God has not created on the face of the earth anything more beloved to Him than freeing slaves nor anything more hated by Him than divorce.” Furthermore, God’s inclusion of manumitting slaves among the acts of expiation shows its high standing, since expiations are what remove the prescribed punishment from the offender [in the Hereafter]. Only what is equal to the offense and countering it can do that, just as only what is equal to and counters ritual filth can remove it. So it is the most comprehensive element in purification and the most effective in cleansing. 

Thus, since manumitting slaves absolves the repercussions of major offenses, we understand that it serves as a means of drawing closer to God, earning great rewards and great standing. Additionally, God Most High and glorious has made it a form of redemption for taking a life unjustly [in manslaughter]. And it is [worth] what was suspended by that killing in terms of what worship was due God Most High in that life and for which He had created that life. God most blessed and high has also accepted manumission as a redemption for the inviolability of the month [of Ramadan], if the fasting person violates it by having sexual intercourse during the fast. So this further clarifies the eminence of this deed and its lofty standing. And God knows best.

The aspect of drawing closer to God through manumission, and God knows best, is that the slave is like their master, both in essence and in characteristics, except that some of the legal rulings obtaining for the slave are not those of their master. For God made the slave the property of the master, placed them under the master’s authority. Thus the slave’s standing is lower than that of their master. Therefore, the slave is not capable of owning property, and because of that they are exempt from paying Zakat and performing Hajj, jihad, and Friday prayer, which are among the cornerstones of Islam. So if their master frees them, this ensures several positive meanings:

Among these meanings is that [the master] recognizes the slave’s right of affinity (mujānasa) and similar status (mushākala), like one experiencing the rights of kinship and neighborliness. So the manumitter grants the slave the freedom and the joy of empowerment that the master inherently possesses. And that becomes similar to giving charity to a relative or perspicacious neighbor who is similar in emotional capacity, wealth, and honor.

And among them is that the master liberates the slave from the humiliation and oppression that bring distress to the slave whenever they contemplate their situation. This is equivalent to freeing a captive from captivity or an imprisoned, debased person from their imprisonment.

Among these meanings is that the manumitter removes from them the lowly service that had occupied them from tending to themselves. This is thus like freeing one’s debtor from their guilt or one’s hired laborer from their work.

And among them is that the manumitter allows the slave to avail themselves of their own talents and uses, which serve them in place of wealth. This is thus like one who gives charity to the poor, assisting them, and funding them with what suffices them.

Among these meanings is that the manumitter provides them with the opportunity to own property, enabling them to draw closer to God Most High through Zakat and voluntary charitable contributions, as well as the generous giving of grants and gifts. It is thus as if the manumitter enriches a poor person or someone indigent.

And among [the positive aspects of manumission] is that the manumitter makes the [former] slave eligible to perform the obligatory pilgrimage [i.e., the Hajj], engage in warfare in the path of God, and participate in the Friday prayer. The manumitter is thus one who assists in the path of God in both fighting and in the Hajj. By configuring manumission in this manner, it serves as a redemption for the unintentional killing of a person, as the perpetrator deprives the victim of the ability to engage in their previously accessible acts of worship. Therefore, manumission was instituted to fulfill the right of God Most High, enabling the liberated soul to engage in worship previously unattainable. With this framework, manumission transforms into a virtuous deed, drawing one closer to God. Consequently, it merits inclusion among the branches of faith, akin to fasting, feeding the needy, and giving charity. And God knows best.

God glorious and magnificent said, “And be good to parents, and to the near of kin, the orphans, the needy, and to the neighbor near of kin and the neighbor not related, to the companion on a journey and the wayfarer, and to those whom you possess rightfully” (4:36). It has come from the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that the last matters he spoke about were prayer and those you possess rightfully. He kept speaking about that, with the words flowing off his tongue. It has been transmitted that he was saying [on his deathbed], “Prayer, prayer. Fear God concerning those whom you rightfully possess.” So God Most High advised His servants, and then His messenger confirmed this.

Slaves are thus called to be treated well, like parents and neighbors, and those enjoined to pray. This signifies the obligation of excellence towards them and the prohibition on treating them unjustly. This begins with no one saying, upon mentioning their male slave, “my slave.” Rather they should say, “my boy.” They should not say, regarding female slaves, “my slave woman,” but rather, “my girl.” A report has also come from the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, to that effect. This manner conveys two meanings. First, that true worship is due to God alone, glorified and magnified be He, and that when a person says to someone they own “my slave” and “my slave woman,” this is self-aggrandizing and attributing to themselves regarding that person the status that God attributes to Himself regarding them. This is not permissible. Second, it might cause the slave to think that, with one who says to their slave the likes of “This is my slave,” unnecessarily belittling and humiliating them while it benefits the one who said it nothing. This might cause the slave to dislike them, leading the slave to flee or be disobedient and other such things that people suffer from their slaves if they are disliked by them. It is therefore better for owners to avoid this in favor of what is better, what is farther from reproach, and closer to amiability and gentleness. And God knows best.

And those who read this and do not burden a slave with more than they can bear, not depriving them of food or tormenting them, not abusing them with severe language that weighs heavily upon them or beating them excessively, unless they have committed a ḥadd crime and thus have the punishment meted out to them, these are all firm duties (ʿazāʾim). Additionally, it is preferable for the owner to take on some of the slave’s work, not dumping it all on them; and to feed them from what [the owner] eats, clothe them from what they wear, and not to burden them with work that would raise doubts and cause people to be disgusted with them; and not to cause them harm at all in the first place or in punishment, but to defend [against bad conduct] in what other ways they can. If the owner strikes them when it is fitting to do so, they do not slap them. Rather, they sit down beside him, not forcing them to stand up before him or in his presence.

If the owner overworks their slave in such a way, that is forbidden. If they are not pleased with that slave or the slave’s comportment, they should sell them. And this becomes an obligation for them if they fear they are not sufficiently able to restrain themselves from wronging the slave. But if they are pleased with the slave’s service, they should increase their beneficence and good treatment of them. Then, if much time has passed, and the owner sees that the slave is loyal and fulfills the trust they are given, the owner should arrange a marriage for them if they are aware that the slave has a need to marry.

If the owner realizes they do not need that slave, they should free them. To free them as an act of charity is better and finer than to require something in return. And if a man with some repulsive malady purchases a slave to serve him, and the slave finds his health displeasing, let the man sell them. And if one purchases a slave woman and she dislikes that he touches her or sleeps with her, let him not touch her nor sleep with her and not have sex with her without her permission. And let him sell her if she wishes.

Benevolence towards one’s slave encompasses gratefulness to God Most High for liberation and freedom from the humiliation of slavery, justice, and fairness towards those one possesses, and winning over the slave, promoting their obedience and sincerity. Thus, benevolence [towards one’s slave] benefits the owner in both this world and the next, and also benefits the slave.

Reports have been transmitted with such a message in general and in specific. It was transmitted from the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that he said, “Each of you is a shepherd, and each of you is responsible for their flock.” And he said, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, “Those that suit you from among your slaves, feed them from what you eat and clothe them from what you wear. And those who do not suit you, sell them. And do not inflict harm on God’s creation.” And he said, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, “God has made them a test under your responsibility. Whoever has responsibility over his brother, let him feed him from his food and clothe him from his dress. And let him not burden him with what overwhelms him. And if he does burden him, let him assist him.”

And he said, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, “Whoever purchases a slave, and their dispositions are not compatible, let them sell them. And let them purchase one whose disposition (shīma) is compatible with theirs. For people have different dispositions. And do not inflict pain on the slaves of God.” 

And he said, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, “A slave is due their food and clothing. Clothe them from what you wear, and feed them from what you eat. And do not burden them with work they cannot bear.”

And he said, “If one of your slaves comes to you with your food, and they have sufficed you with their efforts over the hot stove, then call them and eat with them. And if you do not do this, then take some food for them and place it in their hands.”

ʿUbāda b. al-Walīd said: I and my father set out seeking knowledge in this neighborhood of the Anṣār before they all perished. The first person we encountered was Abū al-Yasar, the companion of the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him. With him was a young slave of his. Abū al-Yasar was wearing a Yemeni cloak (burda wa maʿāfirī,), and his slave was wearing the same. I asked him about that. He stroked my head and said, “O God, bless him, O my nephew. These two eyes of mine beheld, these two ears of mine did hear and my heart comprehended,” and he pointed to his breast, “the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, when he said, ‘Feed them from what you eat and clothe them from what you wear.’ So if I were to give him all I own in the world it would be easier upon me than for him to take my good deeds on the Day of Resurrection.”

And it has come from the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that a man came to him and said, “My slave is sinning, so I beat him.” He replied, “Show me (ramūnī) your beating and his sin, and if your beating is greater, then it will be taken out on you.” The man replied, “O Messenger of God, for the sin of my slave I curse him.” [The Prophet] replied, “For your cursing and his sin, if your cursing is greater, it will be taken out on you.” The man said, “O Messenger of God, then there is no good for us in them.” The Prophet said, “Have you not heard God say, ‘We shall set up scales of justice for the Day of Resurrection’ (21:47).”

And it has come from him, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that a man from among his companions sat before him and said, “O Messenger of God, I have two slaves who lie to me, betray me, and disobey me, so I beat and curse them. How do I stand regarding them?” The Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, replied, “The extent to which they betrayed you, disobeyed you, and lied to you will be measured against how much you punish them. If your punishment is less severe than their wrongs, the merit is yours. If your punishment exceeds the gravity of their wrongs, the excess will be counted for them.” So the man began to weep and cry aloud before the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him. The Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, asked, “What is wrong with him? Does he not recite the book of God that ‘We shall set up scales of justice for the Day of Resurrection, so that not a soul will be dealt with unjustly in the least. And if there be even the weight of a mustard seed, We will bring it [to account]. And enough are We to take account?’” The man replied, “O Messenger of God, I can think of nothing better for myself than them. Bear witness that they are all free.”

[Ḥalīmī] said: Abū Dharr, may God be pleased with him, passed by a man who was beating a slave of his and said, “I have no idea what you will say to your Lord tomorrow or what He will say to you. You will say, ‘O God, forgive [me].’ And He will say, ‘Did you forgive?’ You will say, ‘O God, have mercy on me.’ And He will say, ‘Did you have mercy?’”

And it has come from him, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that a man came to him and said, “How much should we forgive a slave?” He was silent. The man asked him again. Again, he was silent. On the third time, he said, “Excuse him seventy times each day.” And in another narration, the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, was asked, “How much should we excuse and forgive our slaves?” He replied, “Seventy times.” [Ḥalīmī] said: The meaning here is excusing them to the same extent that they seek God’s forgiveness every day, for [the Prophet] had told his followers about what he would say himself, so that they could emulate him, namely, “Indeed, I seek God’s forgiveness each day seventy times.” This was also transmitted [with the wording] “a hundred times.” So he instructed them to excuse their slaves to the same degree that they seek God’s forgiveness for themselves. In some reports, “Excuse them one hundred times.” It has also come from him, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that “One who treats slaves badly will not enter the Garden. So honor them as you honor your own children, and feed them from what you all eat.” People asked, “What can benefit us in this worldly life, O Messenger of God?” He replied, “A horse you can bridle and fight on in the path of God and a slave who suffices your needs. If he prays, then he is your brother. If he prays, he is your brother.”

In another hadith, Fāṭima’s hands, may God be pleased with her, had become calloused from using the hand mill [i.e., housework]. So she went to the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, asking for a servant. When some prisoners of war were brought to him, he gave her one. He said to her, “I have seen her praying, so do not strike her. For I have been forbidden to kill those who pray.” Fāṭima, may God be pleased with her, said, “If she is like this, then she will work one day and I will work one day.” And in another hadith a man said to the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, “What should I do with these two [slaves]?” He replied, “Your brother, so be good to him. If he is overwhelmed, then be with him or work with him,” meaning: if the work becomes too much for him to bear, then share it with him.

Abū Masʿūd [al-Badrī] said: I was striking a slave of mine when I heard a voice behind me: “Think, Abū Masʿūd!” But I did not turn around to face the person, since my anger had consumed me. But it was the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, so when I saw him, the whip fell from my hand out of my awe for him. The Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, said to me, “By God, God has more power over you than you have over him.” I said, “O Messenger of God, I will never strike a slave of mine again!”

And Muʿāwiya b. al-Ḥakam said, may God have mercy on him: I had a slave girl who took care of a flock of sheep of mine. A wolf snatched away some of them. Now I am a human being, and I get upset as all people do. So I smacked her. Then I went to the Messenger of God, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, and mentioned this to him, and he regarded it as a serious action on my part. I said, “O Messenger of God, should I not free her?” He replied, “Call her here.” Then he asked her, “Where [is God]? [These two words are omitted for some reason]” She answered, “In the heavens.” He asked, “And who am I?” She replied, “You are the Messenger of God.” He said, “Free her, for she is a believer.” And it has come from him, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that he said, “Whoever inflicts a hadd punishment on a slave who had not committed the offense or strikes them, the expiation is to free them.” The meaning of this is that the person had inflicted the hadd punishment on them, but that the slave did not deserve it. And from him, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, as well, “Do not beat a slave, for you do not know what you may deserve of that (mā tuwāfiqūn min dhālik),” and in another transmission, “for you do not know the implications of your actions.” And it has also come from him, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, that he said, “Bad character is an ill omen, as is poor conduct in owning a slave (sū’ al-malaka). Tending [to relatives] increases one’s lifespan, and giving in charity wards off the touch of evil.” And it has come from a number of the Companions, may God be pleased with them, that they ruled on striking a slave the same way they did for a child, and they freed the slave when compensation (qiṣāṣ) [for an injury] was not forthcoming. And Ḥabīb b. Abī Thābit, may God be pleased with him, said, “It was said: Don’t combine night and day for servants, meaning: spare them at night if they worked during the day.”

And from Abū Hurayra, may God be pleased with him, that one day he was riding a mule, and he seated his slave behind him. Someone said: Why not leave him to walk behind your mount? Abū Hurayra, may God be pleased with him, replied, “I would rather have two idols of burning fire walking with me than have my slave walk behind my mount.” It has come that Dībāgh b. Salāma had a slave, and he was angered by him. So he castrated him and cut off his nose. Then he went to the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, and told him about this. He responded harshly to Dībāgh and ordered the slave freed. [The slave] asked, “Do you guarantee me [protection and care], O Messenger of God?” He replied, “Every Muslim guarantees that.” And the meaning of this is that he commanded [Dībāgh] to manumit the slave as an expiation for his evil towards him, not that he made castration and cutting off his nose the act of manumission, as some scholars have thought, using this as an analogy for other cases. And God knows best.

One seeking to purchase a slave should have good intentions in doing so, committing themselves to light treatment and kindness to him. They should only buy him if the slave is, in their opinion, suitable for them, not because someone else considers him good for them, and they do not want him for themselves. They should seek God’s guidance (istikhāra) first. Then, if they buy him, they should take him by the forelock and say, “O God, I ask You for his good and what good be in him, and I seek refuge with You from his evil and what evil be in him.” For this is transmitted from the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him. There are many hadiths and reports on this matter. We have written here what suffices, God willing.

If the slave soon thereafter commits some hadd offense or drinks alcohol, steals, or slanders [someone], his owner should carry out the hadd punishment on him, due to the Prophet, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him, saying, “Carry out the hadd on those whom you rightfully possess.” And he said, “If one of your slaves fornicates, then lash them according to the hadd punishment, and do not do more.”

If it is a case of a male or female slave owned by a woman, and they commit a hadd offense, then she should not carry out the hadd punishment on them. This is also the case for the slave who has an agreement for gradual self-purchase. And if they are owned by a man who is a qualified scholar (ahl al-ijtihād) and upstanding, then he can carry out the hadd punishment. If he is one of the masses (ʿāmma), then he can do so based on his own knowledge only if the matter is something evident. But if it is a matter in the purview of the [scholarly] elect, then it should be someone he knows from the jurists. And I have heard some of our colleagues say: No one should carry out the hadd punishment but him. All of this is clarified in the Book of Rulings. And God grants success.

8–9, 20; David Galenson, “The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An Economic Analysis,” Journal of Economic History 44, no. 1 (1984): 4; Brown, Slavery and Islam, 72.